Comparative Political Studies

Partisan Cues and Vote Choice in New Multiparty Systems

Journal:	*Comparative Political Studies*
Manuscript ID:	CPS-14-0143.R1
Manuscript Type:	Original Article
Keywords:	Political Parties, Elections, Public Opinion, and Voting Behavior, African Politics, Experimental Research

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Keywords: Cues, parties, ballot design, elections, Uganda

Abstract: 146 words

Entire document: 11,959 words

Cues play important roles in individuals' political decision-making, affecting how they vote, form issue attitudes, and process information. These cues can take a range of forms, including partisan and ideological labels, referent endorsements, and candidate demographics. Partisan cues have received much attention in research on countries with long-standing party systems, such as the United States (Downs 1957; Huckfeldt *et al.* 1999; Kam 2005; Lau & Redlawsk 2001; Rahn 1993). In these settings, voters use such cues to determine candidates' policy stances, or they support copartisans based on psychological bonds to parties that are often passed down across generations (Green *et al.* 2002).

Do voters in countries with newer party systems also use partisan cues in their political decision-making? Following the U.S.-based literature, partisan cues might seem to have limited impact in such settings because parties may be too young to provide useful heuristics about policy or performance, and too evanescent to be the objects of psychological attachments. As such, voters are presumed to focus more heavily on other attributes, such as distributional practices (Keefer & Vlaicu 2008); ethnicity or other ascriptive identities (Birnir 2007; Chandra 2004; Ferree 2011; Posner 2005); or endorsements from key societal figures, such as traditional elites (Baldwin 2013; Koter 2013).

Scholars have overlooked the potential importance of partisan cues in electoral decision-making in systems with new parties (Bullock 2011; Samuels & Zucco 2014). Our paper marks the first of which we aware to examine this. We present a theory that, even in systems in which major parties are young, voters may use partisan cues to assess candidates on a range of topics, such as ability to produce desirable economic or security outcomes, preferences in areas such as distribution and democracy, and electoral viability. Notably, partisan labels can serve these functions even when few voters have established strong psychological bonds to young parties,

and when parties' platforms are vague. In short, partisan cues could be meaningful to voters, even in systems in which some parties are still in their infancy.

We seek to fill this gap by examining the effects of partisan cues on vote choice in a context where such effects are especially unlikely: Uganda's 2011 general election. Three factors bias against our finding significant partisan cue effects here. First, our outcome of interest is vote choice for real candidates, rather than support for unfamiliar policies or fictitious candidates. In most studies of partisan cues, subjects have limited knowledge and weak attitudes about the object of the inquiry, and party label is often the only heuristic available. In our study, subjects were asked to make a meaningful choice between familiar candidates in an environment where there were numerous alternate decision-making cues.

Second, the precise timing of our study—after a months-long campaign and just days before an election—biased against the finding of significant partisan cue effects because many subjects had already decided on their favored candidates. Partisan cues are likely to have real-world implications if they can affect vote choice at the end of a campaign. And third, the current system in Uganda was introduced in 2006, making the 2011 elections only the second time candidates had run under party banners. To our knowledge, no study of party cue effects has focused on a system as young as Uganda's. If partisan cue effects are identifiable in Uganda, then such heuristics are probably meaningful to voters in a much broader range of contexts than previously considered.

We conducted an experiment in which we varied Ugandans' exposure to partisan cues via an important, yet overlooked medium for the transmittal of cues: electoral ballots. Subjects were assigned to treatment conditions where they were given mock ballots that included or excluded partisan identifiers, and then asked to mark their preferred candidates in presidential,

parliamentary, and local contests. This design enhances external validity, in that it used real candidates, was conducted in close proximity to an actual election, and administered treatments using a medium that often transmits partisan cues (i.e., ballots).

Our findings indicate that partisan cues did affect vote choice in Uganda. Subjects whose ballots contained partisan cues were more likely to vote for major parties, less likely to support independent candidates, more likely to cast straight-ticket votes, and more likely to match their votes with their self-reported partisan identity. These effects were substantively as well a statistically significant; for example, the predicted probability of straight-ticket voting is 16% higher for those subjects who saw partisan cues compared to those who did not. These strong effects challenge the conventional view that partisan cues are less consequential in nascent party systems (Brader *et al.* 2013; Bullock 2011; Greene 2011; Magaloni 2006; Merolla *et al.* 2007) and suggest a need to broaden our conceptualization of the mechanisms through which partisan cues might affect electoral decision-making.

A Theory on the Utility of Partisan Cues for Voting in New Party Systems

Research on partisan cues has focused almost exclusively on well-established party systems. Scholars of the U.S., in particular, have examined the effect of partisan cues on vote choice, opinion formation, information processing, and affective responses (Chaiken 1980; Goren 2005; Goren *et al*. 2009; Kam 2005; Lau *et al.* 2008; Petty & Cacioppo 1986; Rahn 1993). In these contexts, well-established parties are more likely to have stable reputations and programmatic cores from which their elites do not deviate significantly (Snyder & Ting 2002), while voters themselves are socialized, through cross-generational communications, to internalize identification with parties (Campbell *et al.* 1960; Converse 1969; Downs 1957;

Fowler & Kam 2007; Gerber & Green 1998; Green *et al.* 2002; Jennings *et al.* 2009). Party labels are deemed influential because they act as information shortcuts or because they activate long-standing psychological attachments.

In contrast, studies of newer party systems have generally avoided examining the importance of partisan cues (Samuels & Zucco 2014). Given that individuals often use heuristics when information is scarce or costly (Tversky & Kahneman 1974), we might expect that cues would be especially influential in newer party systems, where paucity of political information and non-habituated political behavior make landscapes harder to navigate. However, scholars have focused on other types of heuristics—such as ascriptive identity (Birnir 2007; Chandra 2004; Conroy-Krutz 2013; Ferree 2011; Posner 2005) and clientelistic distribution (Keefer & Vlaicu 2008)—and eschewed study of partisan cues. Partisan cues are presumed to hold limited utility where parties avoid taking policy positions or are ideologically incoherent (Bleck & van de Walle 2011, 2013; Brader *et al.* 2013; Conroy-Krutz & Lewis 2011) and have yet to establish reputations based on previous terms in office (Greene 2011).[4] In short, one might presume that citizens do not know or care about parties in such cases, and thus partisan cues will have minimal or no effects.

We theorize that partisan cues could affect voters' decision making in new party systems by affecting perceptions of candidates' abilities, preferences, and viability. First, party labels can signal which candidate has more capacity to deliver favorable outcomes. If a candidate is identified as sharing partisanship with a well-regarded national executive, that candidate is likely to benefit, *vis-à-vis* an opposition-affiliated or independent competitor. On the other hand, a candidate who shares partisanship with a president whose performance is judged to be lacking is

[4] For a review of these arguments, see Lupu & Stokes (2010).

likely to be harmed, *vis-à-vis* opponents, by the inclusion of labels.[5] Additionally, candidates whose partisan labels indicate they have access to nationally (or, in some cases, locally) [6] powerful actors might be viewed as possessing greater capacity to deliver patronage.

Second, partisan cues can affect citizens' expectations about candidates' preferences in key areas, such as patronage and democracy. Party leaders' regional or ascriptive identities might signal the distributional preferences (i.e., whom should be targeted) of the party as a whole (Chandra 2004). Furthermore, the delivery of largess in campaigns, during which party symbols and colors are displayed, might be interpreted as an indication of the party's future commitment to recipients. And in systems emerging from authoritarianism, even new parties may indicate distinct democratic credentials based on events before, during, and after the transition. Parties often develop reputations as advocates for democracy and human rights, perpetrators of authoritarian abuses, or harbingers of (dis)order during the period immediately preceding or

[5] Even in situations of information scarcity, most citizens are likely to have formed an opinion on the president's performance. And voters should be able to make these assessments even if the president has only been in power for a short period of time. For example, research on economic voting finds citizens focus primarily on election-year performance, suggesting that they do not rely on long periods of time to assess incumbent competence (Achen & Bartels 2004; Alesina *et al.* 1993; Fair 1978; Healy & Lenz 2014; Kiewiet 1983; Kramer 1971).

[6] In situations in which local officials play significant roles in determining patronage distributions, the voter might consider it advantageous to elect a local representative who shares the partisanship of whatever party is dominant locally. Note that this party might not match the party dominant nationally.

following the establishment of new regimes. In short, voters can use partisan labels to assess candidates' preferences, even when parties themselves have vague, indistinguishable platforms.

Finally, partisan cues can provide insight about candidates' electoral viability. If party labels indicate that a candidate is a member of a party that has recently performed well, that candidate is more likely to be seen as viable, and therefore more worthy of the voter's consideration. Conversely, affiliates of poorly performing parties and political independents (in many contexts) will be viewed as less viable, and likely harmed by the inclusion of labels.[7] Further, voters might assume that the party label will attract other partisan-minded voters. Thus, party affiliation might signal the top contenders and deter sincere voting for low-viability candidates (McKelvey & Ordeshook 1972).

These factors suggest that party labels may influence voting even in new party systems. Importantly, our theory about how party labels can affect vote choice does not depend on citizens' development of psychological attachments to parties,[8] nor on parties having clear and

[7] Here, the party's performance at the relevant level is important. For example, in assessing a candidate's viability for a legislative seat, the voter will likely consider how the candidate's party performed locally, rather than nationally.

[8] It is possible that voters in such settings will have psychological attachments to certain elites, and vote for associated parties accordingly. In fact, we expect that sentiments towards elites, many of whom were politically or socially important prior to forming a party, constitute the basis for party-citizen connections in many countries with nascent party systems. This mechanism, however, is distinct from that proposed in the US-based literature, which focuses on psychological attachments to *parties*, rather than to leaders who hold central positions in them. We discuss this mechanism further with regard to the Ugandan case.

distinct platforms. If party labels carry meaning, then partisan cues could alter citizen choices by providing new information about candidates' affiliations, which could in turn help voters assess candidates' abilities, preferences, and viability. Further, partisan cues could prime citizens to consider candidates' partisanship, rather than candidates' personal attributes, when assessing electoral options. In theory, either mechanism—learning or priming—could increase party-based voting.[9]

While there are many studies on the development of party systems (for a review, see Ferree *et al.* 2014),[10] few have examined whether partisan affiliation is meaningful to voters' decision-making. We know of only a few studies specifically on the effects of partisan cues in newer party systems, most of which examine how cues affect policy preference, rather than vote choice (Brader & Tucker 2012; Brader *et al.* 2013; Merolla *et al.* 2007; Samuels & Zucco 2014). We are aware of only one study that examines the effects of cues on party-based voting: an experiment testing varying electronic voting designs in Argentina (Calvo *et al*. 2009; Katz *et al*. 2011). In this study, however, party names and logos were equally apparent across all treatment conditions, while the prominence and accessibility of candidate names, among other things, varied across treatments. In other words, the study evaluates whether the presence of candidate

[9] We return to this point in the discussion.

[10] Studies have focused on Africa (Arriola 2013; Brambor *et al.* 2007; Elischer 2013; Kuenzi & Lambright 2001; LeBas 2011; Lindberg 2007; Mozaffar *et al.* 2003; Riedl 2014), Eastern Europe (Kitschelt *et al.* 1999; Moser 1999), Latin America (Mainwaring & Scully 1995; Roberts & Wibbels 1999), and Asia (Chhibber & Kollman 1998; Hicken & Kuhonta 2014).

cues, rather than partisan cues, affects party-based voting.[11] We know of no research specifically on how partisan cues affect vote choice in new party systems.[12]

Research Design

To adjudicate between the expectation of no effect and our hypothesis that partisan cues increase party-based voting, we conduct an experiment testing the effects of partisan cues on vote choice in a party system that was, at the time of our study, only five years old: Uganda. The experiment was conducted using mock ballots and held just days before Uganda's 2011 general election. Subjects were assigned to one of five ballot types; these ballots contained varying combinations of visual and textual elements, such as party names, party symbols, and candidate photographs. Our theory predicts that subjects who received ballots containing partisan cues (i.e., party names or symbols) would be more likely to vote based on candidate partisan affiliation than their counterparts who received ballots including no such cues.

[11] The treatments' complexity also makes it difficult to isolate the potential effects of cues on decision-making processes from mechanical effects of different vote technologies on ballot marking. The treatments varied considerably in the logistical challenges that subjects faced when trying to locate their favored candidate from over 70 candidates and 24 parties.

[12] Additionally, the party system in our case, Uganda, is younger than those studied by others, including Mexico (Merolla *et al.* 2007), Brazil (Samuels & Zucco 2014), Argentina (Calvo *et al*. 2009; Katz *et al*. 2011), and former Communist systems of Russia and Poland (Brader & Tucker 2012; Brader *et al*. 2013).

In this section, we discuss our use of mock ballots for administration of treatments, the selection of the Ugandan case and the research site, the experimental design, and subject recruitment.

Ballots and Partisan Cues

Ballots are an important—and understudied—potential source of cues affecting voters' decision-making. Policy makers often suggest that ballots include myriad textual and visual elements to facilitate informed and autonomous voting. These elements can include information about candidates, such as their photographs or occupations, or about parties, such as their names or symbols. Visual elements, such as photographs and symbols, are especially recommended for countries where voters have less education, information, and voting experience (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network 2011; Reynolds & Steenburgen 2006; Smith *et al.* 2009).

Despite widespread use of such identifiers, we lack systematic evidence about their effects on voting, particularly outside of established democracies (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network 2007; Katz *et al.* 2011; Reynolds & Steenburgen 2006).[13] While proponents of the inclusion of such elements argue that doing so encourages participation and reduces voter error, such recommendations fail to consider that they could themselves affect voter preferences. Candidate photographs could, for example, shift support in favor of more attractive contenders, or to those who appear to be coethnics of the voter ([Working paper by authors]). And, as we

[13] For observational analyses of partisan cues on ballots in established democracies, see Meredith & Grissom (2010); Schaffner & Streb (2002); Shaffner *et al.* (2007); and Welch & Bledsoe (1986). For experimental studies, see Buckley *et al.* (2007); Klein & Baum (2001); and Reynolds & Steenbergen (2006).

suggest in this paper, partisan cues could affect voter preferences, even in countries with new party systems. Ballots provide the last stimuli that might affect voters' decision-making processes and could therefore have sizeable effects on vote outcomes, even though cue effects are often ephemeral. In the experiment described below, we assigned subjects to mock ballots containing different textual and visual elements, and thus measure these elements'—and, more specifically, partisan cues'—effects on voting.

Case Selection: Uganda

Two considerations guided our selection of Uganda as the experimental site: its recent history of including variable textual and visual elements on ballots, and its status as a country with a new party system. On the first count, the fact that Ugandan ballots have changed occurs in recent elections means that conditions that included or excluded various elements would all be plausible conditions for most voters, thus increasing the experiment's external validity. Candidates' photographs, for example, appeared on ballots starting in the 1994 Constituent Assembly elections, while party names and symbols were not included until 2006.

The absence of partisan labels from Ugandan ballots prior to 2006 stems from the fact that parties had long been prohibited from electioneering in the country. Upon seizing power in 1986, President Yoweri Museveni established a unique "no-party democracy," ostensibly to diminish the ethnicization of politics (Museveni 1997). Multiparty competition was not restored until 2006, following the public's approval in a referendum the previous year, meaning that 2011 marked only the second election under Uganda's current multiparty regime. The main parties have been Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) and the opposition Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), which was founded in 2004 as a breakaway from the NRM.

Together these two main parties won 96.7% of the presidential vote in the election preceding our experiment (2006).[14] Ugandans have had limited time to develop psychological attachments to parties, and parties' identities are still in flux.[15]

Despite the unlikelihood of strong, psychological attachments to parties of the type often passed down over generations in countries like the United States, we expected that partisan labels would affect Ugandans' assessments of candidates' abilities, preferences, and viability—and thus their electoral choices. First, politics in Uganda are centered on a strong, personalistic leader (Carbone 2008; Rubongoya 2007; Tripp 2010), and elections are seen by some as referenda on President Museveni's perceived leadership in economics, security, and resource distributions (Conroy-Krutz & Logan 2012). When candidates' partisan affiliations are highlighted, voters who are dissatisfied with recent government performance will be more likely to punish candidates attached to Museveni's NRM, determining that they, too, will be less capable. Conversely, those pleased with Museveni will be more likely to favor his copartisans. Further, candidates not affiliated with the NRM, which distributes significant patronage

[14] Two parties that field candidates pre-date the current multiparty era—the Democratic Party (DP), founded in the mid-1950s, and the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), founded in 1960—but neither enjoys significant support.

[15] Further, parties in Uganda are not simply coterminous with ethnic identities. The respective leaders of the NRM and FDC in recent elections, Museveni and Dr. Kizza Besigye, are both from closely related ethnic groups in the Western Region, and both parties draw significant electoral support from all regions of the country (save the Western Region, where the NRM is overwhelmingly dominant).

nationally (Carbone 2008; Izama & Wilkerson 2011; Tripp 2010), might be deemed less able to deliver goods.[16]

Second, partisan labels can signal candidate preferences, in areas such as resource distributions and democratic development. Voters in Uganda's Northern Region, for example, have long felt marginalized by the Western-dominated government; NRM affiliation might signal a candidate's disinterest in providing patronage to such voters, while an FDC label might signal interest in changing the distributional status quo. And voters who prefer a strong leader—despite (or perhaps because of) undemocratic tendencies such as cracking down on media houses and stacking the Electoral Commission (EC) with ruling-party loyalists (Izama & Wilkerson 2011; Mwenda & Tangri 2005; Tripp 2010)—may be more likely to support candidates identified as copartisans of the president. Those uncomfortable with such practices will be more attracted to those identified with the opposition party.

Finally, partisan cues likely signal candidate viability in Uganda. The NRM is clearly a dominant party, having won 59.3% of the presidential vote in 2006, and in most circumstances a candidate for parliamentary or local office is likely to seem more viable when identified as an NRM partisan, given the party's electoral popularity in many regions and its significant resource advantages. However, the FDC has claimed substantial support as well, winning 37.4% of the

[16] Alternatively, voters might consider candidates' abilities to access resources from local governments, which have some ability to affect distributions (Lambright 2011). Parties other than the NRM control some local governments, especially in urban areas and regions such as the North.

2006 vote. And in areas where the FDC is popular,[17] an FDC label likely signals viability. On the other hand, minor-party candidates and independents will likely be seen as less electable. The most-established minor parties—the DP and UPC—won a combined 2.4% of the 2006 presidential vote and only claimed pluralities at a combined seven polling stations in the entire country. Independents, who are present in many races and who often have formerly been affiliated with a major party, are usually disadvantaged by a lack of access to parties' organizational and resource capacities. While pluralities of candidates for various important offices were independents, only a small number of winners were.[18] When partisan labels are present, minor-party and independent candidates are more likely to be overlooked in favor of second-best choices deemed more likely to win.

In summary, Uganda was an ideal site for research, because of its history of varying ballot design and the youth of its party system. Like in most of Africa, and in new party systems elsewhere, political competition in Uganda takes place on an uneven playing field,[19] dominated by a single powerful leader, whereby numerous subsidiary political actors vie for support (van de Walle 2003). As in other young party systems, there are a number of potential candidate-centric

[17] The FDC won a plurality of presidential votes at 6,699 polling stations (33.9% of the total) in 2006.

[18] Independents constituted 41.8% of candidates for Parliament and 40.7% for district chairmanships, but they won only 12.6% of parliamentary seats and 12.5% of district chairmanships.

[19] In 2011, Uganda was among 46% of the sub-Saharan countries ranked as partly free, according to Freedom House's evaluation. Only 19% of the countries in the region were considered free at that time, while 35% were considered not free at all (Freedom House 2011).

characteristics that might affect vote choice (e.g., ethnicity, region of origin, status, past performance, and resource endowments). We posit that, when cued, partisan affiliation becomes more likely to play an important role.

The experiment was conducted in one parliamentary constituency—Soroti County, which is a rural area in the country's northeast. Soroti was selected for logistical reasons—an author was already collecting data there—and because its demographics and ethnically diverse candidate pools facilitated study of the effects of ballot design on ethnic voting, as well (as reported in [working paper by co-authors]).

Soroti is an opposition-supporting area in a country with a dominant party. Majorities there have supported the FDC in recent presidential elections, and the party has had great success recently claiming parliamentary seats and district chairmanships. Many residents have evinced displeasure with the president's performance in terms of the economy,[20] democracy,[21] and security.[22] While President Museveni was expected to win handily in 2011, non-NRM candidates for Soroti's down-ballot races had credible chances of winning office.[23]

[20] In a pre-election survey conducted by Afrobarometer (January 2011), 44% of Soroti County respondents said that the country's economy was "very" or "fairly bad." 35% of Ugandans responded similarly.

[21] 56% of Soroti respondents in the Afrobarometer said that they were dissatisfied with democracy in Uganda (vs. 28% country-wide).

[22] The NRM saw its fortunes in Soroti decline significantly between elections in 2001—when Museveni won a near plurality (43.5%) and the party took the local parliamentary seat—and 2006. This decline is likely attributable, at least in part, to a Lord's Resistance Army attack on Soroti in 2003, which left many residents with a sense that the central government was not

Our thesis should apply equally to pro-opposition areas as to pro-government areas, and equally to individuals who support the opposition or government. Party labels will help voters assess candidates' abilities, preferences, and viability regardless of which party is more popular. The main difference will be in which party benefits the most from the partisan cues. In pro-opposition areas and among opposition supporters, party cues should benefit the opposition. In pro-government areas and among government supporters, partisan cues should benefit the government. Thus, we would expect that the FDC would be the main benefactor in Soroti, but not uniformly across all voters.[24] In sum, we expect that voters in Soroti will use partisan cues to assess candidates, even though the locally dominant party is quite young.

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offering them adequate protection. Overall, 50% of Soroti residents in the Afrobarometer said they were dissatisfied with Museveni's performance (vs. 18% nationally).

[23] We cannot determine whether a vote for an FDC candidate in a down-ballot race is expressive or strategic. Few likely believed that the FDC would win a parliamentary majority. However, most citizens are concerned with constituency services rather than law-making. It is not clear whether voters would believe that electing NRM or FDC candidates in down-ballot races would be more likely to generate office holders capable of distributing resources. On the one hand, NRM-affiliated officials likely have more access to the party's substantial largess, while on the other, FDC-affiliated officials might have more access to resources available to local government, in which the opposition has a much more substantial presence.

[24] We cannot directly test the effect of partisan cues in pro-government areas given our data. However, our evidence from Soroti is suggestive in that the total vote for the NRM is unaffected by partisan cues for our sample as a whole, but NRM candidates did gain votes from NRM supporters when partisan cues were present.

Experimental Design

Subjects were assigned to one of five treatments, which varied according to the inclusion or exclusion of partisan cues, as well as a cross-cutting candidate photograph treatment.[25] All five include candidates' names. Treatment 1 (the control) included no other information. Treatment 2 included party names, while Treatment 3 included party names and symbols.[26] Treatment 4 included photographs, and Treatment 5 included all elements: party names and symbols, and candidate photographs. Table 1 shows the conditions analyzed in this paper by ballot features. For each treatment, the information provided accurately portrays the actual candidates. Treatment 5 most closely mimics real Ugandan ballots.[27] Images of mock ballots are available in Figure 1.

[25] We designed the experiment to examine the effects of photos on voting in addition to testing the effects of partisan cues (see: [Working paper by authors]). In regression analyses here, we control for the photo treatment.

[26] The EC requires that independent candidates select an object from a pre-designated list, on a first-come, first-served basis. Independent presidential candidates can design their own symbols, subject to EC approval. The object appears on the ballot in the same location as would a party symbol. We include (or exclude) the object (e.g., soccer ball, chair, etc.) in the same way that we include (or exclude) party symbols.

[27] The experimental ballots were similar in size, shape, and design to official ballots, although they were also clearly marked as samples and lacked the EC logo that appears on official ballots. In addition, subjects were reminded before the ballot exercise and at the end of the survey that

[Table 1 goes around here]

[Figure 1 goes around here]

After demographic data were collected, subjects were asked to mark one mock ballot for each of four real-world contests: president, Member of Parliament, district women's Member of Parliament,[28] and district chairperson.[29] Candidates from the two major parties, at least one from a minor party, and several independents contested each race.[30] Each subject received the same type of ballot for each contest. Subjects marked ballots in private, without assistance from research staff or others, and placed their ballots in an envelope.[31] Following this, subjects were asked a series of additional questions.

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the ballots they had "cast" were not official, and those wishing to vote would have to go to the appropriate polling station on designated election days.

[28] Uganda is divided into 112 districts, each of which elects one woman MP.

[29] Each district elects a chairperson, which is the highest local-government position. All offices, with the exception of president, are elected by plurality in single-member districts. The president is elected by majority, though no presidential election has ever required a second round.

[30] The minimum number of candidates in a contest was six (district chair) and the maximum was nine (MP). See Appendix A for a list of candidates from each contest, including their current and former partisan affiliation, ethnicity, and percent of support amongst subjects in the control.

[31] These envelopes contained no identifying information about the subject, but were marked with a serial number that allowed later matching to the subject's completed questionnaire.

Subject Recruitment

Subjects were selected via multistage sampling. Enumeration Areas (EAs), as delineated by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, were first randomly selected, with EAs' likelihood of selection proportionate to their population as of the last census (2002). Enumerators then selected households via a random-walk pattern, and individuals within selected households were recruited using a Kish grid.[32] Subjects had to be at least eighteen years old, Ugandan citizens, and able to communicate in at least one of the three survey languages (English, Iteso, and Kumam); they did not have to be registered voters or literate. Most selected gave consent and completed the survey (93.5%).

Balance checks suggest that our generated samples were statistically equivalent on selected observables across treatments. These checks were conducted with variables that we expected would not be affected by the treatments, but which could theoretically affect party-

[32] Questionnaire numbers were used to select subjects (N=897) based on Kish grid requirements, as well as to assign treatment conditions. An unanticipated interaction occurred, whereby some positions on the Kish grid did not have equal probabilities of being assigned to each treatment. A detailed description of the issue and our strategies for addressing it are available in Appendix B. For all analyses in this paper, we include only subjects from positions on the Kish grid that had an equal probability of being assigned to comparison conditions (N=529). This maintains the experimental design, but does cost considerable statistical power and limits external validity, in that the analysis population is not representative of the population at the within-household level. The results hold when using an alternate strategy of including all subjects (and thus a representative sample) and controlling for factors associated with subject selection and treatment assignment (Appendix C).

based voting, including demographics (sex, age, wealth, ethnicity, education); 2006 presidential vote; need for assistance when casting ballots in the previous election; political knowledge; and access to news (via radio, newspaper, television).[33] Appendix D reports results for these checks. The only variables for which there are significant differences across treatments are sex and newspaper readership; however, there is no statistically significant difference on either variable when comparing treatments that contained partisan cues to those that did not. These checks suggest that observed differences in outcomes between groups are attributable to the treatments, rather than potential confounders.

External Validity

Our case selection and research design enhance external validity in four respects. First, as previously discussed, most Ugandans have cast ballots with and without partisan identifiers; this means that ballots of either type would be within the realm of most subjects' real-world experiences. Second, our ballots included real-world candidates then campaigning for office. Studies utilizing hypothetical candidates might be biased towards finding larger cue effects, given that subjects will have very little information about the candidates other than the available cues. Third, we conducted the experiment just days prior to the actual elections. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held on 18 February, while local elections were held five days later; our experiment was conducted between 10 and 17 February. Again, conducting the study earlier in, or even prior to, the campaign would likely bias effects upward, since subjects would have had less information about candidates and have to rely more on ballot-provided cues. The

[33] Details on these variables and the reasons for their inclusion in balance checks are reported in Appendix D.

number of undecided voters, who are more easily swayed, is also likely higher early in a campaign. Any study attempting to determine whether partisan cues affect voting, then, should ideally be held as close to the election as possible. Finally, our subjects filled out their mock ballots in secret and used separate papers for each of the contests studied, a procedure similar to the one that Ugandans actually face at polling stations. This design represents a particularly hard test of the hypothesis that partisan cues can affect vote choice in new party systems, given that we are evaluating support for real-world candidates at the end of a campaign in a party system that was then only five years old.

Measurement

To test the effect of partisan cues on voting, we compare the votes recorded on our mock ballots for those treatments that contain both party name and symbol (3 and 5) against those that do not contain any information about parties (1 and 4).[34] We cannot directly observe whether voters considered party affiliation when marking ballots, so we look for observable implications of decision-making criteria. We operationalize party-based voting in three ways: 1) increased voting for major-party candidates and decreased voting for minor-party candidates and independents; 2) straight-ticket voting; and 3) voting in accordance with party identification.[35]

[34] We discuss additional analyses involving Treatment 2 in the discussion section.

[35] The descriptive statistics, coding rules, and question wording for the outcome measures described in this section can be found in Appendix E.

For each, we code the dependent variables to indicate the dimensions of vote choice we wish to test based on the attributes of the candidates selected by each subject.[36]

We first posit that major-party candidates benefit from decision-making that weights party considerations more heavily, while minor-party candidates and independents lose votes. Major parties have more adherents, so they gain support when voters consider party. Furthermore, when party is emphasized, strategic voters are more wary of wasting votes on minor-party candidates and independents. Schaffner *et al*. (2007), working in the two-party U.S. system, find that the majority party benefits from partisan elections, and Katz *et al*. (2011), working in Argentina, find that minor parties benefited from candidate-centric displays. In sum, we expect that partisan cues increase voting for major-party candidates and decrease voting for minor-party candidates and independents. This first operationalization requires three measures: *Major Parties*, *Minor Parties*, and *Independents* measure the total number of votes for major-party, minor-party, and independent candidates, respectively.[37] All range from 0 to 4.

Our second expectation is that party-based decision-making manifests in higher rates of straight-ticket voting (Kimball 2003). Partisan cues should generate greater consistency, such that more voters choose candidates from the same party for all contests. Voters may choose

[36] Alternate approaches, such as use of interaction terms, would be unwieldy given that there are thirty-one candidates across the four races; seven parties, plus independent candidates; and multiple outcome measures of interest. The primary models presented here include all four races, and code all unmarked ballot contests as zero.

[37] Minor parties included the DP, UPC, People's Development Party, People's Progressive Party, and Uganda Federal Alliance. The most popular of the minor parties in 2011, the UPC, received just 1.3% of the presidential vote in Soroti.

candidates from a previously favored party for all contests, or the party affiliation of a single favored candidate in a salient contest may anchor decisions for less-salient ones. *Straight-Ticket* is a binary variable coded 1 if a subject voted for candidates from the same party in all four contests, and 0 otherwise.

Third, we expect that voter partisan identification exerts a stronger influence on vote choice when partisan considerations are emphasized. Partisan cues might provoke partisans to "come home," therefore increasing the match between the partisan identification of voters and the partisanship of the candidates they select. *Party-ID Match* measures the total votes for candidates from a subject's preferred party. Our main formulation of this measure includes only those subjects who identified a party to which they "feel close." The measure sums across the four contests and ranges from 0 to 4.

Collectively, these three measurement approaches provide a methodologically and theoretically sound basis for evaluating whether partisan cues increase party-based voting. The third operationalization is the most common conception of party-based voting, while the first two are strongest with respect to causal inference. The first two are based solely on how subjects marked the ballots, and we can feel confident that differences between groups reflect differences in voting. The third has advantages with respect to construct validity, but it requires a post-treatment measure of partisan identification, which makes interpretation of causal effects more difficult.[38] Consistent results across the three approaches strengthen our conclusions about the causal effects of partisan cues on party-based voting.

[38] A closer match between vote choice and party ID in partisan cue conditions could be because cues caused partisans to vote according to their partisan preferences, or because cues caused subjects to report feeling close to the party of their favored candidates. Theoretically, the former

Analysis and Results

Across all three dimensions, the results indicate that partisan cues affect vote choice. Table 2 displays the results of regression analyses of the effect of partisan cues (Treatments 3 and 5) compared to no partisan cues (Treatments 1 and 4), controlling for the cross-cutting feature (candidate photos). We use logistic analysis for the binary measure of straight-ticket voting and ordered logistic analysis for others, where outcomes range from 0 to 4. Figure 2 graphs the means and 95% confidence intervals for subjects who were and were not exposed to partisan cues. The estimated effects of partisan cues on voting are strong and consistent.

[Table 2 goes around here]

[Figure 2 goes around here]

First, partisan cues significantly increased votes for major-party candidates and significantly decreased votes for independent candidates, as expected. The substantive size of the effects is notable, especially for a new party system (Bullock 2011). The estimates indicate that the probability of voting for major-party candidates in all contests increased by 13% when subjects were exposed to partisan cues. We do not see the expected decline in support for minor parties, probably because of a floor effect. There were no viable minor-party candidates in the down-ballot contests,[39] so there was little room for loss of votes due to the inclusion of party identifiers. Instead, the evidence suggests that the inclusion of partisan cues discouraged

is more likely, but we cannot rule out the latter. We opted for a post-treatment measure of party ID because a pre-test mentioning parties may have biased how subjects marked their ballots.

[39] Amongst subjects assigned to the control, only 6% of votes in the women MP race, 11% the MP race, and 3% in the chairperson race were for minor-party candidates.

subjects from voting for independent candidates. Partisan cues decreased the probability of voting for any number of independent candidates by 18%. Partisan cues seem to have induced subjects to vote for major-party candidates instead of independents.

Second, considerably more voters expressed consistent party preferences when partisan identifiers were on the ballot. Subjects who saw partisan cues were 16% more likely to vote straight-ticket than those who did not.

Third, self-identified partisans were significantly more likely to vote for copartisan candidates in the presence of partisan cues. The probability that a subject voted for all the candidates from his/her preferred party was 11% higher when partisan cues were included on the ballot than when they were not. These results suggest that party attachments exert greater influence on vote choice when partisan cues are present.

In sum, there is considerable evidence that partisan cues affect voting, even in a party system as young as Uganda's. The results shown in Table 2 are robust to an alternate methodological approach; Appendix F shows comparison of means test results conducted separately for Treatment 1 versus 3 (those without photographs) and for Treatment 4 versus 5 (those with photographs).[40]

Furthermore, these results are robust to different coding decisions and alternate specifications of the model (see Appendix G).[41] Our results are not due to a selection bias based

[40] The results are consistent with only one exception: the difference of means between Treatments 4 and 5 for party-ID match is not significant (p=.14). Appendix F also shows the means and standard deviations for each treatment.

[41] The descriptive statistics, coding rules, and question wording for the robustness checks can be found in Appendix H.

on who chose to vote. The treatment has no effect on subjects' willingness to mark the ballot, nor on the total number of contests marked. Additionally, our coding rule for missing votes does not affect our conclusions. The foregoing analyses include all possible responses from all subjects, with missing ballot choices coded as zero, but the results do not change notably if we drop subjects who failed to mark their ballots at all, or if we drop subjects who failed to mark one or more contests on the ballot.

Our findings remain unchanged when we examine alternate formulations of the outcome variables. For major-party voting, the key results remain significant if we include only the most popular party in Soroti (the FDC) instead of the two most popular parties. For straight-ticket voting, the results hold if we create a more nuanced measure. We summed the total number of down-ballot vote choices with the same partisan affiliation as the presidential vote choice.[42] Partisan cues significantly predict the degree of party matching between presidential and down-ballot votes. Furthermore, the results for straight-ticket voting are the same if we include only those subjects who *could* vote straight ticket based on their presidential pick. Only the FDC, NRM, and UPC fielded candidates in all four contests. Among only those subjects who voted for the FDC, NRM, or UPC presidential candidates, partisan cues significantly increased straight-ticket voting. The results also hold for party-ID voting if we restrict our sample to those who could vote for copartisans in all four contests (i.e., FDC, NRM, or UPC partisans). Finally, disaggregating our analyses to evaluate the presidential, MP, women MP, and chairperson contests separately shows that our results are not driven by just one contest. Interestingly, we

[42] An individual coded as 3 would have voted for candidates from the same party in all races. One coded as 2 would have voted for a candidate for one down-ballot race whose partisanship did not match his or her presidential pick, etc.

find that the partisan cues have no effect on the presidential race and that cue effects are stronger if we consider only the three down-ballot contests.[43]

In sum, we find strong and robust evidence that the inclusion of partisan cues on ballots increased party-based voting. The strong effects of partisan cues on vote choice are striking given the newness of the party system in Uganda.

Discussion

In this section we provide suggestive evidence about the nature of the change in voting and the possible mechanism motivating the increase in party-based voting. Our goal here is to use available evidence to probe the nature of the processes that might be generating the observed effects on vote choice.[44]

Partisan Cues Decrease Votes for Former Copartisans and for Coethnics

The results of additional analyses suggest that partisan cues led subjects to switch votes in predictable ways: namely, they privileged 1) their party's current candidates over independents who were formerly copartisans, and 2) copartisan ties over coethnic bonds. First, as noted above, partisan cues resulted in significantly higher support for major-party candidates, and lower support for independents. The types of independents most often abandoned by

[43] This between-race variation is consistent with literature suggesting that cues are less influential in contests of the highest salience (Nicholson 2012), but with only four races we are unable to test effects of contest-level characteristics such as salience.

[44] The descriptive statistics, coding rules, and question wording for these analyses can be found in Appendix I.

subjects in the presence of partisan cues were those who were formerly copartisans of the subject. Nearly all independent candidates in Soroti were previously affiliated with a major party (Appendix A). Results from an ordered logit model (Table 3, Column 1) indicate that partisan cues significantly decreased the number of former copartisan independents supported (*b*=-.84, SE=.25, *p*=.00). In other words, partisan cues increased subjects' likelihood of voting for the current flag-bearer of their favored party over former affiliates of their favored party.

[Table 3 goes around here]

Second, partisan cues also seem to affect ethnic voting. Soroti County is an ethnically divided constituency, with 69.1% identifying as Iteso and 29.1% as Kumam (2002 census). If partisan cues increase party-based voting, we should expect the presence of such cues to increase willingness to support candidates from another ethnic group in instances in which copartisanship and coethnicity cross-cut. The district chairperson contest provides an excellent opportunity to test this expectation, given that the two major-party candidates came from different ethnic groups.[45] In that contest, George Michael Egunyu, a Kumam, was the NRM candidate, while Daniel Ediau of the Iteso group stood for the FDC. Logistic regression analyses indicate that partisan cues increased voting for non-coethnic candidates when including our entire subject population (*b*=.47, SE=.20, *p*=.02) (Column 2, Table 3), as well as when the analysis is limited to voters who were cross-pressured, such that they could either vote for a copartisan or a coethnic major-party candidate, but not both (*b*=.64, SE=.32, *p*=.04) (Column 3, Table 3). Though we cannot be certain that these changes in ethnic voting are due to vote switching between major-party candidates, the results suggest that subjects were more likely to consider party, and less

[45] In the MP race, both major-party candidates were Kumam, while all candidates in the district women's MP race were Iteso. None of our subjects had coethnic presidential candidates.

likely to consider other possible heuristics, when partisan cues were present. We are hesitant to generalize on the basis of findings from this particular election, but these results are intriguing and suggest a need for further research on how partisan cues affect ethnic voting.

Causal Processes: Priming, not Learning

What causal process might be responsible for the strong effects of partisan cues? Much of the literature, especially on new party systems, suggests that cues are influential because they provide voters with novel information about candidates (Birnir 2007; Chandra 2004; Conroy-Krutz 2013; Ferree 2011; Posner 2005). Voters might care about, but be unaware of, candidates' partisan affiliations. Partisan cues could thus provide voters with actionable new information to deploy when deciding their vote.

Priming is an alternate causal mechanism to learning (Iyengar & Kinder 1987; Lenz 2009). Partisan cues might increase the salience of party characteristics over candidate characteristics, and affect vote choice accordingly. Voters might be reminded of the importance of parties in securing and distributing resources, and coordinating to achieve favorable economic and security outcomes. They also might be more likely to consider how officials tend to govern as part of organized groups, rather than as individuals. For example, a voter who would have supported a coethnic candidate, if left to focus on candidate traits, might instead vote for someone whose partisan label vividly signals their stance for or against President Museveni. Or, as another example, a voter who would have selected the best-educated administrator for local office might be provoked by partisan cues to prioritize candidates' relationships with those who control party and state coffers. And, partisan cues might remind voters that party is a significant

determinant of whether individual candidates are viable, thus leading them to vote strategically, even if individual-level traits suggest the candidate should be popular.

Our evidence suggests that information is *not* the causal mechanism generating the partisan cue effects we find. A priming mechanism is far more consistent with the evidence.[46] To evaluate whether certain ballot cues increased subjects' knowledge of candidate partisanship, thus affecting their vote choices, we asked subjects to identify the partisanship of all twenty-three candidates running for MP, women MP, or district chair. After marking their ballot and putting it in an envelope, subjects were shown unmarked ballots of the type matching their treatment condition and asked about the partisanship of the candidates. In other words, subjects did not have to recall information from when they marked the ballot because they were looking at the assigned ballot treatment while answering the questions. The variable *Know Partisanship All* totals the number of candidates whose party affiliation was correctly identified. Regression analysis of partisan cues' effects on knowledge of candidate partisanship yields insignificant results (b=-.29, SE= .59, p=0.62) (Column 4, Table 3).[47]

[46] Evaluating causal mechanisms is a difficult task with respect to causal inference (Green *et al*. 2010). We provide suggestive evidence by examining whether our experimental treatments are associated with the hypothesized mechanism.

[47] Because subjects might ignore information about candidates who are not of interest, we also evaluate a less-demanding criterion for learning. *Know Partisanship Voted* totals the number of correctly identified party affiliations only for the three candidates that the subject marked on the ballots. The results here are also insignificant (b=-.09, SE= .18, p=0.62) (Column 5, Table 3). Our findings for both outcomes are not sensitive to the coding of non-responses. And we see no

Although we expect that partisan cues do improve voter knowledge in some contexts and under some conditions, the evidence suggests that they did not do so here. Even though we presume that most voters are aware that the bus and the key are the symbols of the NRM and FDC, respectively, given the ubiquity of those parties' paraphernalia, voters were probably already significantly knowledgeable about major-party candidates by the time of our study, at the end of a long campaign. On average, subjects in the control identified the affiliation of 4.4 out of 6 (73%) major-party candidates, suggesting a ceiling effect. And while knowledge of independents' and minor-party candidates' affiliations was much lower—on average, 6.3 out of 17 (37%)—matching English-language words and symbols to party names requires certain skills and prior knowledge that our subjects might not have possessed. Perhaps subjects were unable to make sense of the symbols and labels for independent and minor-party candidates, especially given that most symbols were selected just prior to official campaigning. Subjects might not have known, for example, that a soccer ball or radio signifies that the candidate is an independent, rather than a member of some obscure party seeking to appeal to youth or music lovers, or that the lantern represents the tiny Progressive People's Party.

Analysis of an additional treatment provides further support for the idea that partisan cues affect voting through a priming, rather than learning, mechanism. In Treatment 2 we included only the name of the party, but not the party symbol. This allows us to examine whether the effect of partisan cues is mostly due to the provision of written information or the visual imagery of the party symbol. For this analysis we restrict our sample to those who have at least some formal education, because we want to be confident that the English-language party names and

evidence that the partisan identifiers increased knowledge about former partisans who are now independents (b=-.08, SE=.34, p=.81).

acronyms could be understood. If learning is the primary mechanism, then we expect the full effect of the partisan cues to be evident when we add the party name, and there should be no additional influence from also including the symbol. If priming is the mechanism, then the insignia and colors of the party symbol could be influential, even when they provide no novel information, since visual images are more attention-grabbing and stimulating than text (Graber 1996; Mitchell & Olson 1981; Schill 2012; Zillmann 2006).

The evidence most clearly supports priming, not learning (Appendix J). A comparison of Treatments 1 (control) and 2 (party name) for each of the five outcomes shows that providing textual information had no significant effect on voting, even though we feel confident that those included in the analysis could read the party acronyms, if not the names. However, when comparing Treatments 2 (party name) and 3 (party name and symbol) we find that there was a significant effect just from adding the visual image, even though subjects in both treatments could presumably read the party name. Those who saw the symbol were significantly more likely to vote for major parties (p=.01); less likely to vote for independents (p=.03); and more likely to vote in line with their party ID (p=.01). They were also more likely to vote straight ticket, but not significantly so (p=.23). It seems that even in the presence of complete information, the party symbols altered vote choice, most likely by increasing the salience of party affiliation. Furthermore, the changes are nearly identical in magnitude to those found in the tests of the partisan cues together, suggesting that the full effect of the partisan cues comes from the symbols.

Our findings with regards to causal mechanism have important implications. We do not intend to argue based on this experiment that learning is never a cause of partisan cue effects. Instead, we hope to encourage scholars to reconsider their assumptions about causal mechanisms

underlying cue effects. Scholars of the developing world in particular have too often assumed that cue effects are due to information acquisition without considering information-processing theories. Direct empirical tests of learning, priming, or alternate mechanisms underlying cue effects are extremely rare (Lenz 2009). Our results suggest scholars should be attentive to a broader range of mechanisms through which partisan cues alter attitudes and behaviors, and should seek to evaluate theorized processes empirically.

Importantly, the policy and normative implications are quite different if the behavioral changes from partisan cues are the result of what people learn as opposed to how they decide (Lenz 2009). Practitioners recommend including ballot information (especially visual images like party symbols and candidate photos) under the assumption that this helps voters overcome knowledge deficits and select preferred candidates (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network 2011; Reynolds & Steenburgen 2006; Smith *et al.* 2009). We find no evidence that partisan cues altered voting by facilitating informed choice. Instead, cues may themselves shape preferences through priming. Given the proximity of exposure to ballots and vote choice, subtle cues on ballots can have large effects on vote outcomes, even if their influence on attitudes is ephemeral.

Conclusion

Numerous studies indicate that voters in countries with established party systems rely on partisan cues to streamline their electoral decision-making. However, only a handful of scholars have examined the effects of partisan cues in new party systems, and none have studied vote choice as outcomes. The paucity of scholarship on partisan cues in such settings is likely attributable to researchers' expectation that partisan affiliation is of limited utility in new party

systems. Voters there are assumed to utilize other cues, such as candidates' ascriptive identity or regional ties.

We theorize that, even in new party systems without historical legacies, partisan cues can influence voters because they affect judgments about candidates' capabilities, preferences, and viability. First, voters can use partisan cues to assess candidates' capabilities in areas such as economic development and physical security. When labels emphasize candidates as copartisans of a ruler, those satisfied with that leader's performance are more likely to assess his or her copartisans as similarly capable. Dissatisfied citizens, on the other hand, are likely to punish candidates when cues highlight that they are copartisans of the incumbent. And voters might conclude that candidates whose partisan identity suggests that they are connected to powerful individuals have greater capacity to deliver patronage. Second, voters can use partisan cues to discern candidates' preferences in areas such as goods distribution and democratic development. Namely, partisan labels can help voters discern which candidates share a well-known leader's general preferences, and which do not. Third, partisan cues might signal candidate viability. Therefore, partisan labels can affect vote preferences even when parties are too young to establish psychological ties with voters or offer distinct party platforms. In sum, parties might become meaningful to voters, and partisan cues can affect political decision-making, very soon after the establishment of new party systems.

We tested the effects of partisan cues on voting in Uganda when multiparty political competition was only five-years old, and partisan cue effects would seem especially unlikely. Subjects were asked to indicate their support for real-world national- and local-level candidates on mock ballots that included (or excluded) party identifiers. The experiment was conducted just days prior to the actual election using procedures similar to those used at actual polling stations,

thus enhancing the external validity of the study. The study provides an extremely rigorous test of the partisan cue thesis given that we examine the influence of a subtle cue on vote choice for real candidates at the end of a campaign in a multiparty system that had been in existence for such a short time.

Our experiment demonstrates that voters in new party systems do, in fact, use partisan cues in their electoral decision-making; the presence of partisan identifiers increased party-based voting. Subjects who received ballots with party names and symbols were more likely to 1) vote for major parties; 2) avoid voting for independents; 3) cast straight-ticket ballots; and 4) vote for copartisans. Furthermore, the presence of partisan cues did not help subjects accurately identify the partisanship of candidates, and the party names alone did not affect vote choice, which suggests that effects are not due to learning. Instead, the visual images of the party symbols altered voting, likely because they primed partisan considerations. These results challenge the assumption that cue effects in new party systems mainly occur through information provision, rather than through the activation of alternate decision-making criteria.

Party experts need to broaden their considerations of where, how, and why partisan cues affect outcomes such as vote choice. The literature established through examination primarily of the United States provides insights into the types of cues that voters in myriad types of environments use, but the mechanisms at work are likely different in newer party systems than they are in established ones like the U.S. Our findings suggest a need for further research into the magnitude of partisan cue effects on attitudinal formation and behavior, and the mechanisms through which these effects occur, in a broader range of contexts.

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Table 1: Treatment Conditions by Ballot Elements

		Party Name		
		no	yes	yes
		Party Symbol		
		no	no	yes
Pictures	no	1	2	3
	yes	4		5

Table 2: Effects of Partisan Cues on Voting

	(1)			(2)	(3)
	Major party	Minor party	Independent	Straight ticket	Party-ID match
Partisan Cues	0.60***	0.03	-0.71***	0.87***	0.63**
	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.20)
Photographs	-0.10	-0.49	0.31	-0.69**	-0.21
	(0.17)	(0.28)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.19)
Constant				-1.55***	
				(0.22)	
Cut Points	-1.80***	1.56***	-0.21		-1.45***
	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.16)		(0.19)
	-1.26***	3.44***	1.52***		-0.65***
	(0.17)	(0.35)	(0.18)		(0.18)
	-0.33*	4.76***	3.83***		0.33
	(0.15)	(0.60)	(0.38)		(0.17)
	1.02***	5.87***	5.93***		1.53***
	(0.16)	(1.02)	(1.01)		(0.19)
N	429	429	429	429	340
Model	ologit	ologit	ologit	logit	ologit

Notes: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates followed by standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, based on two-tailed tests. Outcome variables are: total votes for major-party, minor-party, and independent candidates; straight-ticket voting, and total votes for candidates from favored party. The outcomes include votes in the presidential, MP, women MP, and chair contests. Models 1 and 2 include all subjects. Model 3 includes only partisans.

Table 3: Nature of Vote Choice, and Knowledge as a Possible Mechanism

	(1)	All subjects (2)	Cross-pressured subjects (3)	(4)	(5)
	Vote for independents who had been copartisans	Vote for non-coethnic in chairperson contest		Know partisan affiliation of all candidates	Know partisan affiliation of vote choices
Party Cues	-0.84***	0.47*	0.64*	-0.29	0.09
	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.32)	(0.59)	(0.18)
Photos	0.26	-0.15	-0.30	-0.47	-0.14
	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.32)	(0.59)	(0.18)
Constant		-0.67***	0.04	10.23***	
		(0.17)	(0.27)	(0.50)	
Cut Points	0.66***				-1.35***
	(0.20)				(0.17)
	2.70***				-0.64***
	(0.29)				(0.16)
					0.36*
					(0.16)
N	324	424	167	429	429
Model	ologit	logit	logit	OLS	ologit

Notes: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates followed by standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, based on two-tailed tests. Outcomes are: (1) total votes for independent candidates who previously were members of the subject's favored party in the MP, women MP, and chair contests; (2 and 3) vote for a non-coethnic chairperson candidate; (4) total number of candidates whose partisan affiliation the subject correctly identified from all 23 candidates in the MP, women MP, and chair contests; and (5) total number of candidates whose partisan affiliation the subject correctly identified from only those candidates for whom the subject voted in the MP, women MP, and chair contests. Model 1 includes only partisans. Model 2 includes all Iteso and Kumam subjects. Model 3 includes only subjects who could vote for either a coethnic or a copartisan chairperson, but not both. Models 4 and 5 include all subjects.

Figure 1: Images of Treatment Features for MP Contest



Figure 2: Means and 95% Confidence Intervals for Vote Outcomes by Exposure to Partisan Cues



Notes: Dots represent mean number of votes, or proportion of votes, by ballot types. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The outcomes include votes in the presidential, MP, women MP, and chair contests. Major party, minor party, and independents are the sums of votes for each type of candidate; the measures range from zero to four. Straight-ticket vote is a binary outcome coded 1 if subject voted for candidates from the same party and 0 otherwise. Party ID match is the mean number of votes for candidates from a subject's preferred party; the measure ranges from zero to four.

Appendix A: Candidate Information

Contest	Candidate	Party	Former Party (if IND)	Ethnicity	% of Support (Control Condition)
President	Kizza Besigye	FDC		Bakiga	45.9
	Abed Bwanika	PDP		Baganda	1.1
	Beti Olive Kamya	UFA		Baganda	2.2
	Samuel Lubega	IND	DP	Baganda	0
	Norbert Mao	DP		Acholi	0.6
	Yoweri Museveni	NRM		Banyankole	37.7
	Olara Otunnu	UPC		Luo	1.6
	Jaberi Bidandi Ssali	PPP		Baganda	0.6
MP	Samuel Anyolo	IND	NRM	Iteso	7.1
	Simon Peter Ebitu	IND	FDC	Kumam	2.2
	Vincent I. Enomu	NRM		Kumam	26.8
	John Lule	IND	FDC	Iteso	6.0
	Engirot Lawrence Okae	UPC		Iteso	3.3
	Raphael Okoropot	DP		Iteso	5.5
	Peter Omolo	FDC		Kumam	33.3
	William Opit	IND	NRM	Iteso	3.3
	Jimmy Oriokot	PPP		Iteso	1.1
Women's MP	Grace Abuin	UPC		Iteso	4.9
	Elizabeth Adecho	IND	NRM	Iteso	3.8
	Rachel Frances Adyango	IND	NRM	Iteso	9.8
	Leah Jesca Amigo	IND	NRM	Iteso	4.4
	Joyce Ijala	IND	FDC	Iteso	2.2
	Ruth Ikuna	IND	FDC	Iteso	14.2
	Julian Fede Iseet	NRM		Iteso	16.4
	Angelline Osegge	FDC		Iteso	34.4
District Chair	Daniel Ediau	FDC		Iteso	16.9
	George Michael Egunyu	NRM		Kumam	44.3
	Leonard Otekat Ekapu	IND	NRM	Iteso	6.0
	George William Okwaput	IND	None	Iteso	5.5
	Napoleon Martina Oliba	UPC		Iteso	2.7
	Jorem Obicho Opian	IND	NRM	Iteso	10.4

Party abbreviations: DP (Democratic Party), FDC (Forum for Democratic Change), IND (Independent), NRM (National Resistance Movement), PDP (People's Development Party), PPP (People's Progressive Party), UFA (Uganda Federal Alliance), UPC (Uganda People's Congress)

Appendix B: Interaction between Kish grid selection of subjects and treatment allocation

A Kish grid was used to select individuals at the household level. The Kish grid uses a pre-assigned table of random numbers and is often used because it is a simple way to generate a representative sample, especially where enumerators lack access to random number generators on site. The instructions and Kish grid that appeared on our questionnaire are reproduced below. Household members were listed in order of age, and then the last digit of the questionnaire was used to identify which individual on the list was to be interviewed.

The treatment conditions were also assigned based on the last digit of the questionnaire. Questionnaires ending in 4 and 8 were randomly assigned to Treatment 1, those ending in 2 and 7 to Treatment 2, those ending in 6 and 0 to Treatment 3, those ending in 5 and 1 to Treatment 4, and those ending in 3 and 9 to Treatment 5.

After the fact, we realized that the overlap in the two procedures created an unanticipated interaction, such that some positions on the Kish grid did not have equal probabilities of being assigned to each treatment. We respond to this issue in two ways. The first, which we use for the analyses presented in the text, maintains the experimental design by excluding observations that did not have equal probabilities. The second, which we present as a robustness check in Appendix C, maintains the full sample in a non-experimental design and controls for factors related to the treatment assignment. All the findings hold regardless of the strategy used.

Experimental Strategy

The first strategy restricts the analyses to those individuals who had an equal chance of being assigned to comparable treatments by virtue of their position in the Kish grid. This approach maintains the experimental design, but does cost us considerable statistical power, in that it reduces the number of observations in the analyses by about 50%. It also limits external validity, in that the analysis population is not representative of the population at the within-household level. Kish grid placement is determined by the number of individuals, and age rankings, within a household, so some demographics were more likely to be included than others. For example, subjects in single-person households are more prevalent in our analysis than in the total subject population, and subjects are about 4 years older on average than those not selected. The gender composition of the population included in our analysis is not significantly different than that of the total subject population.

We describe in greater detail how we determined who should be included in the analysis for the comparison used most often in the paper: that of no partisan cues (Treatments 1 and 4) compared to partisan cues (Treatments 3 and 5).

1. Single-member households: All individuals had an equal chance of being assigned to Treatments 1, 4, 3, or 5 and were included in the analysis.
2. Two-member households: All individuals had an equal chance of being assigned to comparable treatments with and without party cues, and were included in the analysis. Individuals listed first on the Kish grid (i.e., the oldest) had an equal chance of being assigned to Treatment 1 (questionnaires ending in 4 or 8) or Treatment 3 (questionnaires ending in 6 or 0). Individuals listed second on the Kish grid (i.e., the youngest) had an equal chance of being assigned to Treatment 4 (questionnaires ending in 1 or 5) or Treatment 5 (questionnaires ending in 3 or 9).
3. Three-member households: Individuals listed first on the Kish grid (i.e., the oldest) had an equal chance of being assigned to Treatment 1 or 3 if their questionnaires

ended in 4 or 0, and only those individuals were included. Individuals occupying other spaces on the Kish grid did not have an equal chance of being assigned to comparable treatments with and without partisan cues, and were excluded from the analysis. Note that his means that all of the second- and third-oldest members in these households were excluded.

4. Four-member households: Individuals listed first on the Kish grid had an equal chance of being assigned to Treatment 4 or 5 if their questionnaires ended in 1 or 9, and only those individuals were included. Individuals occupying other spaces on the Kish grid did not have an equal chance of being assigned to comparable treatments with and without party cues, and were excluded.
5. Five-member households: None of the individuals in these households had an equal chance of being assigned to comparable treatments, and all were excluded.
6. Six-member households: Individuals listed first on the Kish grid had an equal chance of being assigned to Treatment 1 or 3 if their questionnaires ended in 4 or 0, and only those individuals were included. Individuals occupying other spaces on the Kish grid were excluded.
7. Seven-member households: None of the individuals in these households had an equal chance of being assigned to comparable treatments and all were excluded.
8. Eight-member households: Individuals listed third on the Kish grid had an equal chance of being assigned to Treatment 4 or 5 if their questionnaires ended in 1 or 9, and only those individuals were included. Individuals occupying other spaces on the Kish grid were excluded.
9. Nine-member households: None of the individuals in these households had an equal chance of being assigned to comparable treatments, and all were excluded.
10. Ten-member households: There were no ten-member households.

Observational Strategy

The second strategy uses the full sample and includes controls for those attributes that are related to subjects' location on the Kish grid and thus their selection into the study and assignment to treatments. We include dichotomous variables for household size and the subject's age ranking in the household (which is the same as the list order on the Kish grid). The findings are similar to those included in the body of the paper. The findings are also similar if we control, instead, for age and sex, which are the two observable characteristics that are unbalanced in the full sample. The results of these two models are presented in Appendix C.

RESPONDENT SELECTION - KISH GRID;
In order to determine whom I should interview from this household. Can you please tell me the names and ages of all the adults aged **18 years and above** who have/are living here consecutively for the last 6 months **and are not visitors.**

1. LIST ALL ADULTS AGED 18 AND ABOVE LIVING IN THE HOUSEHOLD AND THEIR AGES FROM THE OLDEST TO THE YOUNGESTIN SECTIONS A & B BELOW.

2. TAKE THE LAST DIGIT OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER AND FIND THE SAME NUMBER IN TABLE 1 BELOW.

3. LOOK ALONG THE ROW OF THE LAST PERSON IN THE LIST. WHERE THIS MEETS THE COLUMN OF THE LAST DIGIT OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER IS THE NUMBER OF THE PERSON TO BE INTERVIEWED.

4. REFER BACK TO THE LIST OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS AND ASK TO SPEAK TO THE PERSON WHOSE NUMBER IS THE SAME AS THE ONE YOU HAVE TAKEN OUT OF THE KISH GRID. IF THAT PERSON IS NOT AT HOME, YOU MUST ARRANGE TO CALL A SECOND AND THIRD TIME TO INTERVIEW THAT INDIVIDUAL. IF HE/SHE IS NOT THERE ON THE THIRD OCCASION, YOU SHOULD SELECT ANOTHER ADULT IN THE HOUSEHOLD BY TAKING THE NUMBER IN THE KISH GRID DIRECTLY ABOVE THE NUMBER OF THE PRESELECTED PERSON ON EVEN NUMBER DATES OR DIRECTLY BELOW ON ODD NUMBER DATES. IF THAT PERSON IS NOT AVAILABLE, GO TO ANOTHER HOUSEHOLD AND RECORD DETAILS ON CONTACT SHEET.

NAMES	AGE	LAST DIGIT ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE									
		1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**0**
1.		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2.		2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1
3.		1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1
4.		1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2
5.		4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3
6.		4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6	1
7.		3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5
8.		3	4	5	6	7	8	1	2	3	4
9.		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	1	2
10.		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Treatments assigned [not included in instructions]		**4**	**2**	**5**	**1**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**	**5**	**3**

Appendix C: Effects of Partisan Cues on Voting with Full Sample and Controls

		1			2	3
		Major party	**Minor party**	**Independent**	**Straight ticket**	**Party-ID match**
Partisan Cues		0.61***	-0.08	-0.65***	0.89***	0.63***
		(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.16)
Photographs		-0.33*	-0.15	0.23	-0.54**	-0.15
		(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.16)
Number of individuals in household eligible to participate in study	2	0.00	-0.64	0.11	0.61	0.16
		(0.22)	(0.34)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.25)
	3	0.07	-0.26	-0.05	0.63	0.11
		(0.24)	(0.35)	(0.26)	(0.36)	(0.27)
	4	-0.04	-0.27	0.05	0.47	-0.20
		(0.26)	(0.37)	(0.27)	(0.38)	(0.28)
	5	0.46	-0.34	-0.01	1.17**	0.24
		(0.32)	(0.46)	(0.34)	(0.43)	(0.34)
	6	-0.66	0.37	0.59	0.00	-0.32
		(0.65)	(0.88)	(0.76)	(.)	(0.69)
	7	0.06	-0.51	0.17	2.45*	0.99
		(0.83)	(1.06)	(0.93)	(1.11)	(0.85)
	8	-1.75	1.20	4.04**	0.00	-1.03
		(1.17)	(1.60)	(1.39)	(.)	(1.21)
	9	-0.92	-0.02	0.25	2.63	-1.31
		(1.39)	(1.75)	(1.64)	(2.30)	(1.52)
Subject's age rank in household listed from oldest to youngest	2	0.19	-0.14	0.00	-0.07	-0.06
		(0.19)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.20)
	3	0.16	0.50	0.16	-0.06	-0.09
		(0.27)	(0.37)	(0.28)	(0.35)	(0.29)
	4	-0.18	0.76	0.14	-0.59	0.21
		(0.33)	(0.43)	(0.36)	(0.50)	(0.35)
	5	0.47	1.87	-0.90	-1.46	0.30
		(0.95)	(1.11)	(1.14)	(1.77)	(0.97)
	6	-0.15	-0.50	-0.40	0.00	-0.44
		(0.98)	(1.44)	(1.17)	(.)	(1.06)
	7	-0.23	-12.23	-14.05	-0.73	15.01
		(2.01)	(712.31)	(734.84)	(2.13)	(610.31)
Constant					-1.98***	
					(0.31)	
Cut Points		-1.92***	1.26***	-0.08		-1.56***
		(0.22)	(0.28)	(0.21)		(0.23)
		-1.28***	3.06***	1.54***		-0.55*
		(0.21)	(0.33)	(0.22)		(0.22)
		-0.37	4.51***	3.70***		0.39
		(0.20)	(0.48)	(0.32)		(0.22)
		0.88***	5.62***	5.91***		1.50***
		(0.20)	(0.75)	(0.74)		(0.23)
N		711	711	711	697	573
Model		ologit	ologit	ologit	logit	ologit

Notes: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates followed by standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, based on two-tailed tests. Outcome variables are: total votes for major-party, minor-party, and independent candidates; straight-ticket voting, and total votes for candidates from favored party. The outcomes include votes in the presidential, MP, women MP, and chair contests. Partisan cues compares Treatments 1 and 4 with 3 and 5. The causal variables are dichotomous. Models 1 and 2 include all subjects. Model 3 includes partisans.

	1			2	3
	Major party	**Minor party**	**Independent**	**Straight ticket**	**Party-ID match**
Partisan Cues	0.68*** (0.14)	-0.09 (0.20)	-0.65*** (0.15)	0.92*** (0.19)	0.63*** (0.15)
Photographs	-0.22 (0.14)	-0.22 (0.20)	0.21 (0.15)	-0.48* (0.19)	-0.14 (0.15)
Age	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Female	-0.23 (0.14)	0.25 (0.20)	0.04 (0.15)	-0.27 (0.19)	-0.29 (0.15)
Constant				-1.37*** (0.29)	
Cut Points	-2.36*** (0.24) -1.71*** (0.23) -0.80*** (0.22) 0.45* (0.22)	1.12*** (0.32) 2.88*** (0.36) 4.34*** (0.51) 5.44*** (0.77)	-0.52* (0.23) 1.09*** (0.24) 3.19*** (0.32) 5.36*** (0.74)		-1.84*** (0.26) -0.84*** (0.24) 0.09 (0.24) 1.20*** (0.25)
N	711	711	711	711	574
Model	ologit	ologit	ologit	logit	ologit

Notes: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates followed by standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, based on two-tailed tests. Outcome variables are: total votes for major-party, minor-party, and independent candidates; straight-ticket voting, and total votes for candidates from favored party. The outcomes include votes in the presidential, MP, women MP, and chair contests. Partisan cues compares Treatments 1 and 4 with 3 and 5. Models 1 and 2 include all subjects. Model 3 includes only partisans.

Justification

This Appendix provides a robustness check on our main strategy for resolving the unanticipated interaction between the Kish grid selection of subjects within a household and the assignment of treatments (see Appendix B for a detailed explanation). The analyses in this Appendix use the full sample of subjects, including those that did and did not have an equal chance of being assigned to comparable treatments. The first table shows the results of analyses that include controls for those attributes that are related to subjects' location on the Kish grid and thus their selection into the study and assignment to treatments. We include dummy variables for household size and the subject's age ranking in the household (which is the same as the list order on the Kish grid). The second table shows the results of analyses that include controls for the two observable characteristics that are unbalanced in the full sample: age and sex.

Appendix D: Balance Check Results and Justification

Variable	Range	Panel 1: Mean per treatment						Panel 2: Mean per group		
		1	2	3	4	5	*p*	No Parties	Parties	*p*
Demographics										
Age	18-88	37.57	37.84	38.42	36.48	35.88	.70	37.05	37.50	.72
Female	0-1	.28	.32	.46	.62	.66	.00	.44	.48	.38
Wealth index	0-5	1.76	1.60	1.64	1.50	1.54	.42	1.63	1.59	.71
Ethnicity										
Iteso	0-1	.65	.65	.60	.63	.66	.91	.64	.63	.93
Kumam	0-1	.35	.35	.40	.37	.34	.91	.36	.37	.93
Past political participation										
Voted 2006?	0-1	.74	.69	.72	.65	.63	.36	.69	.68	.66
Used assistance when voting?	0-1	.16	.11	.08	.14	.13	.64	.15	.11	.25
NRM presidential vote	0-1	.55	.55	.49	.54	.48	.90	.55	.50	.48
FDC presidential vote	0-1	.43	.45	.49	.42	.48	.89	.43	.48	.34
Education & knowledge										
Education	1-9	3.85	3.51	3.79	3.45	3.45	.19	3.66	3.58	.55
Political knowledge index	0-8	5.24	5.03	4.95	4.27	5.00	.17	4.78	4.96	.50
Listen radio news (frequency)	0-3	2.03	2.05	1.80	1.70	1.87	.15	1.87	1.89	.88
Read newspaper (frequency)	0-3	.31	.34	.23	.14	.41	.03	.23	.32	.14
Watch TV news (frequency)	0-3	.04	.05	.13	.08	.08	.25	.06	.09	.21

Notes: The right-hand column in Panel 1 reports results from tests of relationships between variables of interest and the four treatment categories. For these checks, ANOVA tests were conducted for continuous variables, Chi-square tests for categorical and dummy variables, and Kruskal-Wallis tests for ordinal variables. Panel 2 reports means for treatments categorized into party and no-party groups. For comparisons between party and no-party groups, t-tests are conducted for continuous variables, Chi-square tests for categorical and dummy variables, and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests for ordinal variables.

We report on balance checks for fourteen variables, which we included because we did not expect them to be affected by the treatments. These variables included demographic measures (i.e., sex, age, wealth), ethnic dummies (i.e., Iteso, Kumam), and past political leanings (i.e., 2006 presidential vote for NRM and FDC).

We also check for balance on variables that might have affected individuals' abilities to complete ballots of different types, such as education, participation in the 2006 election, need for assistance when casting a ballot in the 2006 election, and consumption of various types of mass media (i.e., radio, newspaper, and television). We also check for balance on an index measuring political knowledge, which we construct from measures of subjects' abilities to 1) identify whether or not a presidential candidate needs a majority to win (he/she does); 2) name the Soroti County Member of Parliament (Peter Omolo); 3) name the Soroti District chairperson (Stephen Ochola); 4) identify the party with the most seats in Parliament (the NRM); and 5-8) name whether the DP, NRM, FDC, and UPC were each members of the opposition coalition, Inter-Party Cooperation (from that list, only FDC was).

Question wordings for variables included in the balance checks were as follows:

Age
How old are you?

Education
What is the highest level of education that you have completed? [Options not read]

Wealth
I am going to read you a list of items. Please tell me which ones your household owns. A radio? A television? A mobile phone? A bicycle or motorcycle? A motor vehicle?

Ethnicity
What is your tribal identity? [Options not read]

2006 Participation
Did you vote in the national elections in 2006?

2006 Vote Assistance
Did you bring someone into the voting booth with you to help you vote in 2006?

2006 Vote
What was the party of the candidate you voted for for president in 2006? [Options not read]

Political Knowledge
Do you happen to know what percentage of votes a candidate has to win in this country to be elected to the presidency? Does the candidate have to receive more than half of all the votes cast, or just one more than any other candidate?

And do you know who is the current Member of Parliament for this constituency? [Options not read]

Can you tell me what party has the most seats (members) in the Parliament at the moment? [Options not read]

Do you know the name of your District Chairperson? [Options not read]

I am going to read you a list of parties. Can you please tell me which ones are members of the Inter-Party Cooperation, or IPC.

--Democratic Party, or DP
--Forum for Democratic Change, or FDC
--National Resistance Movement, or NRM
--Uganda People's Congress, or UPC

Radio News Consumption

Do you ever get your news from the radio? [If "yes," follow up]: I am going to read you a list of radio stations. For each, please tell me how often you listened to it in the last week. Did you listen to it every day, almost every day, one or two days, or not at all this week?

Newspaper News Consumption

This last week, about how often do you think you got news from a newspaper? Do you think you got news from a newspaper every day, almost every day, one or two days, or not at all this week?

Television News Consumption

This last week, about how often do you think you got news from television? Do you think you got news from television every day, almost every day, one or two days, or not at all this week?

Appendix E: Descriptive Statistics, Coding Rules, and Question Wording for Tests of Main Hypothesis

Dependent Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Major-party candidates	429	2.65	1.31	0	4
Minor-party candidates	429	0.18	0.49	0	4
Independent candidates	429	0.68	0.79	0	4
Straight-ticket voting	429	0.20	.40	0	1
Party-ID Match	340	2.20	1.37	0	4

Major-party candidates. Dependent variable sums the total number of votes for major-party (NRM and FDC) candidates in the presidential, MP, women MP, and chairperson contests. Missing votes are coded as 0. Variable includes all subjects.

Minor-party candidates. Dependent variable sums the total number of votes for minor-party (UPC, DP, PDP, PPP, and UFA) candidates in the presidential, MP, women MP, and chairperson contests. Missing votes are coded as 0. Variable includes all subjects.

Independent candidates. Dependent variable sums the total number of votes for independent candidates in the presidential, MP, women MP, and chairperson contests. Missing votes are coded as 0. Variable includes all subjects.

Straight-ticket voting. Dependent variable is coded as 1 if subject voted for candidates from the same party in all four races and 0 otherwise. Subjects coded as 0 include those who voted split-ticket ballots, voted for at least one independent candidate, or did not vote in at least one contest. Variable includes all subjects.

Party-ID match. Dependent variable sums the total number of votes in the presidential, MP, women MP, and chairperson contests for candidates whose party affiliation matched a subject's self-identified party identification. Missing votes among self-identified partisans were coded as 0. The analysis includes only those subjects who reported feeling close to a party.

The question wording for subject *party-ID* was: "I am going to read you a list of parties. Please tell me to which ONE you feel closest, or don't you feel close to any?" [Options read].

Appendix F: Means by treatment and difference of means between treatments

	A	B	C	D	E	F
	No Candidate Photographs			Candidate Photographs		
	No Partisan Cues	Partisan Cues		No Partisan Cues	Partisan Cues	
	Treatment 1	Treatment 3	Compare 1 vs 3	Treatment 4	Treatment 5	Compare 4 vs 5
Major party	2.46 (1.32) n=115	2.87 (1.33) n=107	0.41 ** z=2.72	2.49 (1.26) n=103	2.78 (1.29) n=104	0.29 * z=2.04
Minor party	0.18 (0.47) n=115	0.26 (0.62) n=107	0.08 z=0.85	0.17 (0.47) n=103	0.12 (0.38) n=104	-0.05 z=0.88
Independent	0.74 (0.75) n=115	0.50 (0.72) n=107	-0.24 ** z=-2.68	0.89 (0.85) n=103	0.61 (0.79) n=104	-0.29 ** z=-2.68
Straight ticket	0.17 (0.38) n=115	0.34 (0.47) n=107	0.16 ** χ^2=7.76	0.10 (0.30) n=103	0.20 (0.40) n=104	0.10 * χ^2=4.47
Party-ID match	1.96 (1.42) n=92	2.60 (1.40) n=81	0.65 ** z=3.01	2.01 (1.19) n=85	2.26 (1.38) n=82	0.24 z=1.48

Notes: Cell entries for columns A, B, D, and E represent mean values with standard deviations in parentheses. Cell entries for columns C and F represent difference of means followed by the relevant z or χ^2 statistic. We conducted a Chi-square test for the dichotomous outcome 'straight ticket', and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests for all other outcomes, since they are ordinal. Significant differences are marked as follows: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Outcome variables are: total votes for major-party, minor-party, and independent candidates; straight-ticket voting, and total votes for candidates from favored party. The outcomes include votes in the presidential, MP, women MP, and chair contests. The results for Party-ID match include only partisan subjects, while both partisan and nonpartisan subjects are included for the others. Treatments 1 and 3 do not include candidate photographs. Treatments 4 and 5 do include candidate photographs. Treatments 1 and 4 do not include partisan cues. Treatments 3 and 5 include partisan cues.

Appendix G: Robustness Checks

Missing data for vote choice: Predicting missing data and alternative specifications for missing data

	Marked ballot		Drop observations with four contests unmarked					Drop observations with one or more contests unmarked				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	All four contests unmarked	Number of contests marked	Major party	Minor party	Independent	Straight-ticket	Party-ID match	Major party	Minor party	Independent	Straight-ticket	Party-ID match
Party Cues	-0.33	0.13	0.64***	-0.02	-0.84***	0.84**	0.60**	0.72***	-0.04	-0.85***	0.88***	0.57**
	(0.33)	(0.26)	(0.19)	(0.28)	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.21)
Photos	-0.07	-0.01	-0.15	-0.50	0.32	-0.70**	-0.28	-0.15	-0.48	0.33	-0.69**	-0.31
	(0.32)	(0.26)	(0.19)	(0.28)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.29)	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.21)
Constant	-2.01***					-1.40***					-1.32***	
	(0.26)					(0.22)					(0.22)	
Cut Points		-2.14***	-3.66***	1.40***	-0.51**		-2.01***	-3.86***	1.37***	-0.56**		-2.12***
		(0.24)	(0.38)	(0.22)	(0.17)		(0.23)	(0.43)	(0.23)	(0.18)		(0.24)
		-2.06***	-2.05***	3.31***	1.34***		-0.95***	-2.22***	3.23***	1.28***		-0.98***
		(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.35)	(0.18)		(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.35)	(0.19)		(0.19)
		-1.94***	-0.66***	4.63***	3.68***		0.14	-0.73***	4.55***	3.62***		0.10
		(0.23)	(0.17)	(0.61)	(0.38)		(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.61)	(0.38)		(0.19)
		-1.58***	0.86***	5.73***	5.78***		1.39***	0.78***	5.66***	5.72***		1.29***
		(0.22)	(0.17)	(1.02)	(1.01)		(0.20)	(0.18)	(1.02)	(1.01)		(0.20)
N	429	429	386	386	386	386	317	359	359	359	359	300
Model	logit	ologit	ologit	ologit	ologit	logit	ologit	ologit	ologit	ologit	logit	ologit

Notes: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates followed by standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, based on two-tailed tests.

Alternative measures or coding for vote choice

	Major party	Straight-ticket		Party-ID match
	(13) FDC	(14) Party match between presidential and down-ballot votes	(15) Drop if impossible given presidential vote	(16) Drop if impossible given party ID
Party Cues	0.31	0.65***	0.89***	0.61**
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.20)
Photos	0.06	-0.12	-0.70**	-0.21
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.25)	(0.19)
Constant			-1.51***	
			(0.22)	
Cut Points	-0.36*	-0.83***		-1.52***
	(0.15)	(0.16)		(0.20)
	0.37*	0.42**		-0.70***
	(0.15)	(0.16)		(0.18)
	1.16***	1.65***		0.29
	(0.16)	(0.18)		(0.18)
	2.19***			1.50***
	(0.19)			(0.19)
N	429	429	414	335
Model	ologit	ologit	logit	ologit

Notes: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates followed by standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, based on two-tailed tests..

Vote choice by contest: Presidential, member of parliament, women member of parliament, and local council chairperson

	Major party				Minor party				Independent			
	(17) President	(18) MP	(19) Women MP	(20) Chair-person	(21) President	(22) MP	(23) Women MP	(24) Chair-person	(25) President [1]	(26) MP	(27) Women MP	(28) Chair-person
Party Cues	0.10	0.63**	0.48*	0.34#	0.47	-0.04	-0.90	0.60		-0.74**	-0.38#	-0.55*
	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.47)	(0.41)	(0.60)	(0.49)		(0.26)	(0.21)	(0.27)
Photos	0.05	-0.10	0.02	-0.10	-0.36	-0.36	-1.76*	-0.05		0.29	0.28	0.13
	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.47)	(0.42)	(0.77)	(0.47)		(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.26)
Constant	1.59***	0.33#	-0.18	0.49**	-3.11***	-2.60***	-2.52***	-3.38***		-1.33***	-0.66***	-1.44***
	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.40)	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.44)		(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.21)
N	429	429	429	429	429	429	429	429		429	429	429
Model	logit	logit	logit	Logit	logit	logit	logit	logit		logit	logit	logit

Notes: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates followed by standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, based on two-tailed tests.
[1] Only 5 subjects voted for the independent candidate in the presidential elections, so results are omitted

Appendix H: Descriptive Statistics, Coding Rules, and Question Wording for Robustness Checks

Dependent Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Four contests empty	429	0.10	0.30	0	1
Number of contests marked	429	3.51	1.23	0	4
Major Party: Drop observations with four contests empty	386	2.94	1.02	0	4
Minor Party: Drop observations with four contests empty	386	0.20	0.52	0	4
Independent: Drop observations with four contests empty	386	0.76	0.80	0	4
Straight ticket: Drop observations with four contests empty	386	0.23	0.42	0	1
Party ID: Drop observations with four contests empty	317	2.36	1.28	0	4
Major Party: Drop observations with one or more contests empty	359	3.01	0.99	0	4
Minor Party: Drop observations with one or more contests empty	359	0.21	0.53	0	4
Independent: Drop observations with one or more contests empty	359	0.79	0.81	0	4
Straight ticket: Drop observations with one or more contests empty	359	0.24	0.43	0	1
Party ID: Drop observations with one or more contests empty	300	2.38	1.28	0	4
Major Party: FDC	429	1.47	1.42	0	4
Straight-ticket: Party match presidential and down-ballot	429	1.40	1.08	0	3
Straight-ticket: Drop if impossible given presidential vote	414	0.21	0.41	0	1
Party-ID match: Drop if impossible given party ID	335	2.23	1.36	0	4
Major Party: President	429	0.84	0.37	0	1
Major Party: MP	429	0.64	0.48	0	1
Major Party: Women MP	429	0.52	0.50	0	1
Major Party: Chairperson	429	0.65	0.48	0	1
Minor Party: President	429	0.05	0.21	0	1
Minor Party: MP	429	0.06	0.23	0	1
Minor Party: Women MP	429	0.03	0.18	0	1
Minor Party: Chairperson	429	0.04	0.21	0	1
Independent: President	429	0.00	0.07	0	1
Independent: MP	429	0.18	0.39	0	1
Independent: Women MP	429	0.33	0.47	0	1
Independent: Chairperson	429	0.17	0.37	0	1

Four contests empty. Dependent variable records totally empty ballots. Subjects were coded as 0 if they marked a vote choice for one or more contests, and 1 if they marked no vote choices for all four contests (president, MP, women MP, and chairperson). Variable includes all subjects.

Number of contests marked. Dependent variable sums the number of contest (president, MP, women MP, and chairperson) in which a subject voted. Variable includes all subjects.

One or more contests empty. Analysis is restricted to only those subjects who voted in all four contests (president, MP, women MP, and chairperson), and thus have full ballots. Subjects were coded as missing and dropped from the analysis if they did not vote in one or more contests.

Major Party: FDC. Dependent variable sums the total number of votes for FDC candidates in the presidential, MP, women MP and chairperson contests. Missing votes are coded as 0. Variable includes all subjects.

Straight ticket: Party match between presidential and down-ballot votes. Dependent variable sums the total number of votes for candidates in the MP, women MP, and chairperson contests with the same partisan affiliation as that of a subject's presidential vote choice. Subjects were coded as 3 if they voted for candidates from the same party in all races. Subjects were coded as 2 if the party of two of their down-ballot votes matched the party of their presidential vote. Subjects were coded as 1 if the party of one of their down-ballot votes matched the party of their presidential vote. Subjects were coded as 0 if the party of none of their down-ballot votes matched the party of their presidential vote.

Straight ticket: Drop if straight-ticket voting was impossible given presidential vote. Analysis is restricted to only those subjects who voted for the FDC, NRM, or UPC presidential candidates. Subjects who voted for the PDP, PPP, UFA, DP, or independent candidate for president, and those who did not record a vote choice for president, were dropped from the analysis.

Party-ID match: Drop if party-id match was impossible given party ID. Analysis is restricted to only those subjects who reported feeling close to the FDC, NRM, or UPC parties. Subjects who reported feeling close to other parties, and those who did not report feeling close to a party, were dropped from the analysis.

The question wording for subject *party-ID* was: "I am going to read you a list of parties. Please tell me to which ONE you feel closest, or don't you feel close to any?" [Options read].

Appendix I: Descriptive Statistics, Coding Rules, and Question Wording for Analyses Referenced in Discussion Section

Dependent Variable (Treatments 1, 3, 4, and 5)	**N**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min**	**Max**
Former copartisan independents	324	0.34	0.58	0	2
Non coethnic candidates in chairperson contest	424	0.38	0.49	0	1
Non coethnic candidates in chairperson contest, cross-pressured only	167	0.56	0.50	0	1
Know Partisanship All	429	9.86	6.07	0	23
Know Partisanship Voted	429	1.85	1.17	0	3

Former copartisan independents. Dependent variable sums the total number of votes in the MP, women MP, and chairperson contests for independent candidates who were formerly affiliated with a party that matched a subject's self-identified party-ID. The presidential race did not include candidates formerly affiliated with parties so it is not included in the analysis. Independent candidates were formally affiliated with only the NRM and FDC parties, so only those subjects who reported feeling close to the FDC or NRM parties are included in the analysis. For subjects included in the analysis, missing votes were coded as 0.

Non coethnic candidates in chairperson contest. Dependent variable records a vote for a non-coethnic candidate in the chairperson contest. Kumam subjects who voted an Iteso candidate and Iteso subjects who voted for a Kumam candidate were coded as 1, and all other Kumam and Iteso subjects were coded as 0. Variable includes only Kumam and Iteso subjects. For subjects included in the analysis, missing votes were coded as 0.

Cross-pressured subjects for chairperson contest. Analysis is restricted to only those subjects who could vote for a copartisan or a coethnic candidate in the chairperson contest, but not both. In the chairperson contest, the NRM candidate was Kumam and the FDC candidate was Iteso. Subjects were cross-pressured if they were NRM partisans and Iteso, or they were FDC partisans and Kumam.

Know Partisanship All: Dependent variable sums the total number of candidates whose partisan affiliation or independent status a subject correctly identified. The variable sums responses across all 23 candidates in the MP, women MP, and chairperson contests. For each candidate, correct responses were coded as 1, and incorrect, don't know, and missing responses were coded as 0.

Know Partisanship Voted: Dependent variable sums the total number of candidates whose partisan affiliation or independent status a subject correctly identified. The variable sums responses about only those candidates for whom a subject voted in the MP, women MP, and chairperson contests. For each supported candidate, correct responses were coded as 1, and incorrect, don't know, and missing responses were coded as 0. Missing votes were also coded as 0.

The question wording for *know partisanship* was: "What would you say is the political party of this candidate, or is the candidate an independent?" [Options not read]

Dependent Variable (Literate subjects in treatments 1 and 2)	**N**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min**	**Max**
Major-party candidates	193	2.46	1.35	0	4
Minor-party candidates	193	0.26	0.58	0	4
Independent candidates	193	0.70	0.78	0	3
Straight-ticket voting	193	0.20	0.40	0	1
Party-ID Match	160	1.96	1.43	0	4

Dependent Variable (Literate subjects in treatments 2 and 3)	**N**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min**	**Max**
Major-party candidates	169	2.53	1.44	0	4
Minor-party candidates	169	0.33	0.68	0	4
Independent candidates	169	0.58	0.78	0	3
Straight-ticket voting	169	0.25	0.44	0	1
Party-ID Match	137	2.22	1.49	0	4

Appendix J: Effects of Party Names and Effects of Party Symbols, among Literates

	Major party	Minor party	Independent	Straight ticket	Party-ID match
	1	2	3	4	5
Party Names	-0.36	0.65	-0.40	0.41	0.13
	(0.26)	(0.36)	(0.27)	(0.37)	(0.28)
Constant				-1.64***	
				(0.28)	
Cut Points	-1.96***	1.65***	-0.30		-1.21***
	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.20)		(0.23)
	-1.40***	3.83***	1.50***		-0.32
	(0.22)	(0.48)	(0.24)		(0.20)
	-0.46*	4.95***	3.67***		0.55**
	(0.19)	(0.75)	(0.52)		(0.21)
	0.85***	5.65***			1.45***
	(0.20)	(1.03)			(0.24)
N	193	193	193	193	160
Model	ologit	ologit	ologit	logit	ologit

	6	7	8	9	10
Party symbols	0.69 *	-0.04	-0.69 *	0.43	0.77 *
	(0.28)	(0.36)	(0.31)	(0.35)	(0.31)
Constant				-1.28***	
				(0.25)	
Cut Points	-1.43***	1.12***	-0.01		-1.17***
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.21)		(0.25)
	-0.83***	2.75***	1.62***		-0.25
	(0.21)	(0.36)	(0.26)		(0.22)
	-0.05	4.41***	3.46***		0.31
	(0.20)	(0.73)	(0.52)		(0.22)
	0.98***				1.36***
	(0.21)				(0.25)
N	169	169	169	169	137
Model	ologit	ologit	ologit	logit	ologit

Notes: Cell entries represent coefficient estimates followed by standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, based on two-tailed tests. Outcome variables are: total votes for major-party, minor-party, and independent candidates; straight-ticket voting, and total votes for candidates from favored party. The outcomes include votes in the presidential, MP, women MP, and chair contests. Party names compares Treatment 1 (candidate names only) with Treatment 2 (candidate names and party names). Party symbols compares Treatment 2 with Treatment 3 (candidate names, party names, and party symbols). Only literate subjects are included (those with at least some primary education). Columns 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9 include all literate subjects. Columns 5 and 10 include only literate subjects who are partisans.